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Societal conditions for early and high rates of childbearing were replaced by conditions 
generating late and low levels of fertility common in Western countries. Central among 
factors shaping the latter behaviour (job insecurity, unstable partnership relationships, 
expensive  housing,  and  profound  changes  in  norms,  values  and  attitudes)  were  the 
following: increasing proportions of young people were acquiring advanced education, 
a  majority  of  women  were  gainfully  employed,  yet  women  were  performing  most 
household maintenance and childrearing duties. Two theories prevailed to explain what 
caused changes in family formation and fertility trends. One argues that the economic 
and  social  crises  were  the  principal  causes.  The  other  considered  the  diffusion  of 
western norms, values and attitudes as the prime factors of change. Neither reveals the 
root  cause:  the  replacement  of  state  socialist  regimes  with  economic  and  political 
institutions of contemporary capitalism. The extraordinarily low period TFRs around 
2000 were the result of low fertility of older women born around 1960 overlapping with 
low fertility of young women born during the 1970s. 
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1. Introduction  
The abrupt termination of the autocratic and centrally planned systems in Central and 
Eastern  Europe,  and  the  ensuing  political,  social  and  economic  transition,  were 
historically  unprecedented.  The  fast  changing  societal  environment  generated  rapid 
changes in family formation, partnership relationships and childbearing. New, different 
sets of constraints and incentives for childbearing behaviour emerged in the 1990s. 
How unique and extraordinary these new conditions were can be better understood by 
exploring and outlining the broad historical context and developments of the past two 
centuries. 
Once European populations had passed through the industrial and technological 
revolutions and the demographic transition of the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, the two 
halves of Europe divided by the Iron Curtain took very different paths. During the latter 
decades of the 20
th century, the consequences of social and economic developments in 
the West
2 led to an increase in the importance of factors conducive to low fertility rates 
in  many  Western  European  countries.  In  contrast,  during  the  same  period  societal 
conditions  in  the  state  socialist  authoritarian  and  centrally  planned  regimes  had 
developed an environment that was comparatively favourable for early and relatively 
high rates of childbearing. When the state socialist regimes collapsed in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the entire societal and institutional system was transformed. Incentives 
and constraints related to childbearing ended equally abruptly, and were replaced within 
a period of a few years by a new social, economic and welfare system that is based on 
the same principles as institutional systems in Western societies. During the 1990s and 
the early 21
st century, young people of prime childbearing age adjusted to these new 
conditions,  which  were  mirrored  by  changes  in  family  formation,  partnership 
relationships and patterns of childbearing.  
The principal focus of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the family 
formation  and  childbearing  determinants  during  the  transition  from  socialism  to 
capitalism
3.  Section  2  contains  a  concise  sketch  of  the  secular  historical  context  of 
                                                            
2 In this chapter the dichotomy of Western Europe (the West) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is 
employed. The latter includes all formerly state socialist countries, whereas the former includes the remainder 
of Europe, namely all countries of Northern, Western and Southern Europe where market economies operated 
throughout the 20th century.  
3 Intentionally the actual trends and patterns of family formation and childbearing are not described and 
analyzed in this chapter. A detailed exposition of this topic can be found in the country chapters and an 
overview was presented, for instance, in chapters 7 and 8 in Sobotka (2004). It would be redundant to 
essentially repeat such an analysis in this chapter. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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European fertility trends up to the second half of the 20
th century. Section 3 explores the 
basic circumstances of the Western European fertility decline from the 1960s through 
the 1990s. This analysis of Western European developments is justified and relevant 
because analogous conditions emerged in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse 
of state socialism. In section 4, the basic demographic mechanism of fertility trends 
during the state socialist era is analysed so that these trends can be compared to those of 
Western countries, as well as to those of Central and Eastern Europe of the 1990s and 
2000s.  Section  5  characterises  the  contemporary  historical  context  in  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe.  Section  6  analyses  the  demographic  structural  background  of  the 
extraordinarily low period fertility rates of the mid- to late 1990s. In section 7, the main 
reasons for the fertility trends in the contemporary transitional period are discussed. 
Section  8  deals  with  the  various  specific  factors  modifying  childbearing  during  the 
transition from socialism to capitalism that were identified in the country chapters. In 
the final section, the main conclusions are summarized. 
 
 
2. The secular historical context  
By the middle of the 20
th century, European societies had experienced major economic 
and social transformations. General modernization, industrialization and urbanization, 
which generated the growth of various social strata, especially of the working and the 
middle classes, were spreading throughout Europe. The timing of these processes was 
very different from one country to another. There were still a number of populations 
living in rather underdeveloped economic and social conditions in  countries such as 
Portugal,  Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and, most notably, Albania; as well as 
in regions of deficient development within these and other countries, such as Poland, 
Slovakia and Romania.  
Almost all European populations had passed through the demographic transition 
by mid-20
th century. Individuals and families had adjusted to the historical, structural, 
economic and social changes. Childrearing had become costly, children were no longer 
contributing to the family economy, and children’s contribution to old age security was 
small and decreasing. Economic and psychological costs by far outweighed benefits. 
According to Caldwell (1976), the net flow of wealth transfer from children to parents 
in “primitive and traditional  societies” had been converted to flows of  wealth from 
parents to children. Ariès (1980) concluded that the family “had turned inward upon 
itself  and  organized  itself  in  terms  of  children  and  their  future.  The  parents’  chief Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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psychological and material investment consisted of children to get ahead. … The fewer 
the children, the more time and care could be devoted to each and the better the results.” 
In the wake of the Second World War, “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the 
Adriatic  an  iron  curtain  has  descended  across  the  Continent”  (Churchill  1946). 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe became part of the “Soviet  sphere” under the 
control  of  Moscow.  From  thereon  for  more  than  40  years,  authoritarian,  centrally 
planned  regimes  of  the  type  that  had  been  installed  in  the  Soviet  Union  by  the 
Bolshevik revolution of 1917 were in power in these countries. For these 40-odd years, 
political, economic and social developments in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe differed in fundamental ways from those of Western countries. Fertility levels 
and trends were also distinctly different between the two parts of Europe, shaped by 
varying  sets  of  constraints  and  childbearing  incentives,  and  by  the  accompanying 
changes in values, norms and attitudes. 
 
 
3. Western Europe  
It is crucial to understand the principal determinants of the fertility trends in the West of 
the second half of the 20
th century because analogous conditions were created in the 
Central and Eastern European countries after the collapse of the state socialist regimes 
around 1990. 
The  realization  of  previously  postponed  births  and  marriages  were  the  initial 
impetus for the post-war rise in fertility in Western Europe. The modern welfare state 
was established at that time, and became an important factor in sustaining the baby 
boom through the 1950s and into the early 1960s. Many of the costs of education, 
health  and  welfare  of  children  were  covered  by  the  state,  thus  lowering  costs  of 
childbearing. This was also a period of extraordinary economic growth. Real wages and 
salaries  were  increasing,  employment  was  virtually  guaranteed,  unemployment  was 
low, and housing destroyed by the war was being reconstructed and expanded. These 
conditions  led  people  to  view  parenthood  as  attractive  and  affordable  (Hobcraft  & 
Kiernan 1995, Hobcraft 1996). 
Precipitous declines in period fertility of the 1960s and 1970s, and the persisting 
sub-replacement fertility of the 1980s and 1990s, were brought about by a number of 
interacting factors. The underlying demographic mechanism consisted of a gradually 
declining  fertility  quantum  combined  with  a  postponement  of  marriages  and  of 
childbearing.  Among  the  basic  circumstances  driving  this  demographic  mechanism 
were the following: Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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A. An unprecedented, increasing need for large proportions of the population to 
acquire more than a basic education, 
B. High and increasing labour force participation rates of women, and 
C. Increasing roles and responsibilities of women. 
 
There were a host of other circumstances which contributed to the fertility decline 
and the postponement of parenthood. Generally, it became more difficult for young 
people to establish a household in the latter decades of the 20
th century. It was not easy 
to find employment or to establish oneself in a career during this period, and housing 
costs were rising (Hobcraft 1996; Kohler et al. 2002; Billari et al 2002).   
The advent of reliable, modern means of contraception; access to safe and legal 
induced  abortion;  changing  patterns  of  partnership  relations;  substantial  changes  in 
values, norms and attitudes concerning family formation and childbearing; as well as 
relatively weak family policies in Western countries were significant in generating the 
fertility levels and trends of the late 20
th century. These latter factors are discussed in 
overview chapters 3, 4, 6 and 8, respectively, and in the country chapters.  
 
 
A. The increasing need for a better educated population  
The  technological  advancements  of  the  second  part  of  the  20
th  century  and  the 
restructuring of economies, dominated by the vast expansion of the information and 
service sectors, required that significant and gradually increasing proportions of the 
population be well educated. This demand was satisfied by a considerable expansion of 
educational systems, which absorbed large proportions of young people. The societal 
demand for a skilled and educated work force was matched by the desire and need of 
the young to acquire an advanced education, which became a prerequisite for obtaining 
desirable, well paying positions of gainful employment.  
In  Europe  in  1970,  the  gross  enrolment  ratio
4  (GER)  was  68  percent  at  the 
secondary level and 14 percent at the tertiary level (Table 1). At each level, male GERs 
were higher than female GERs. At the tertiary level, the GER for males was over 60 
percent higher than the female ratio. By 1990, the GERs for men and women combined 
had increased to 92 and 36 percent, respectively. At both the secondary and the tertiary 
                                                            
4 Regrettably the data are for the whole of Europe, not separately for the West. It does not matter that much 
for our purpose. Especially the trends between 1970 and 1990 were mostly driven by developments in 
Western Europe. Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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levels, female GERs increased faster than male GERs. Thus by 1990, the enrolment 
ratios for women were higher than those for males. These trends persisted during the 
1990s. By 1997, virtually all people of secondary school age were enrolled, but the 
GERs for women were somewhat higher than those for men. At the tertiary level, the 
more rapid increase in the enrolment ratio for women was maintained. Consequently, 
46 percent of 20-24-year-old women were enrolled, compared to 40 percent of men in 
this age group. 
 
Table 1:  Gross enrolment ratios
* at the secondary and tertiary levels of  
  education, Europe 1970–1997 
 
Secondary  Tertiary 
Year  Total  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female 
1970  67.5  69.9  65.1  14.4  17.7  11.0 
1990  92.4  91.1  93.7  35.9  35.0  36.9 
1997  99.2  97.2  101.3  42.8  39.5  46.3 
 
Source: Unesco Statistical Yearbook 1999, 2005. 
*Note: Gross enrolment ratios are crude measures. The denominators are populations of strictly defined age groups whereas the 
numerators include all individuals enrolled at the respective educational level some of whom can be from outside the age group 
of the denominator. Thus values higher than 100 can appear and are legitimate 
 
 
In general, these high levels of enrolment in tertiary education have continued to 
increase in the early years of the 21
st century in most countries of Western Europe 
(Table  2). These  rates  have  levelled  off  in  some  countries,  as  demonstrated  by  the 
trends in Austria. In most countries, enrolments of women have continued to increase 
faster  than  those  of  men,  thereby  enlarging  the  gender  gap  in  favour  of  women  in 
advanced education.  
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Table 2:  Gross enrolment ratios at the tertiary level of education by sex,  
  selected Western European countries, 1991–2005 
 
 




B. The increase in female labour force participation rates  
During the second half of the 20
th century, increasing proportions of women in Europe 
joined the labour force. In the years immediately following the Second World War, the 
majority  of  the  gainfully  employed  were  men.  During  the  years  of  the  post-war 
economic expansion, there  was a shortage of  labour, and  women  were increasingly 
drawn  into the  labour force  at all levels and in  many professions (ILO 1990). The 
demand  for  female  labour  continued  to  grow  in  Western  countries  throughout  the 
second half of the 20
th century, and was still going strong early in the 21
st (Table 3). 
The employment rate of women in the 15 Western countries of the European Union 
increased by 16 percent between 1995 and 2005, while the employment rate of men 
grew by only 3 percent.  
 
Country  Sex  1991  1999  2002  2005 
Austria  M  36  52  44  44 
  F  32  55  51  53 
France  M  37  47  47  49 
  F  43  58  60  63 
Italy  M  33  41  47  56 
  F  31  53  63  75 
Netherlands  M  43  49  54  57 
  F  36  50  58  61 
Spain  M  36  52  57  60 
  F  39  62  68  73 
Sweden  M  29  53  60  64 
  F  35  75  92  100 
United Kingdom  M  30  55  56  50 
  F  29  64  70  69 Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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Table 3:  Employment rates in states of the European Union, 1995–2005  
 
EU employment rate 
EU-15 
1995  2000  2005 
Total  60.1  63.4  65.3 
Male  70.5  72.8  72.9 
Female  49.7  54.1  57.7 
 
Source: Eurostat Yearbook, 2006-2007. 
 
 
Women joined the labour force willingly, and for good reasons. For those who 
were married, an important motive was a second income, making it possible to achieve 
a higher standard of living for their families. For single women, employment secured 
the  freedom  to  choose  their  own  course  in  life.  For  all  women,  the  psychological 
benefits  of  self-realization  also  played  an  important  role.  Thus  the  demand  for 
additional labour was matched by large proportions of women desiring employment.  
 
 
C. Increasing roles and responsibilities of women  
The male breadwinner family model was gradually replaced by the dual-earner model. 
Even  though  women  studied  longer,  became  gainfully  employed  and  contributed 
significantly to family income, the division of labour within the family did not keep 
pace  with  these  changes.  The  responsibilities  of  childrearing  and  maintaining 
households continued to be disproportionately carried by women (Table 4). 
According to time use surveys conducted by national statistical offices (Aliaga 
2006) throughout Europe, employed women spend more time on domestic work than 
men, from about 50 percent more in Nordic countries, to three times more in Southern 
Europe. The amount of time employed women spend on domestic work does not differ 
much  between  countries.  It  is  the  contribution  made  by  men  to  childrearing  and 
household  maintenance that  is important.  On average,  men in  Sweden and Norway 
devote about twice as much time to these activities as men in Italy and Spain (Table 4).  
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Table 4:  Time use structure of employed women and men (in hours and  
  minutes per day), selected European countries, 1998–2004  
 
  Spain  France  Italy  Sweden 
United 
Kingdom  Norway 
WOMEN             
Gainful work, study  4:57  4:32  4:39  4:05  4:06  3:46 
Domestic work  3:29  3:40  3:51  3:32  3:28  3:26 
Travel  1:22  1:05  1:28  1:28  1:33  1:17 
Sleep  8:11  8:38  8:00  8:05  8:25  8:07 
Meals, personal care  2:28  2:57  2:44  2:23  2:07  2:02 
Free time, incl. unspecified  3:33  3:08  3:18  4:27  4:21  5:22 
Total  24  24  24  24  24  24 
MEN             
Gainful work, study  6:11  5:44  6:13  5:17  5:42  4:56 
Domestic work  1:20  1:53  1:10  2:23  1:54  2:12 
Travel  1:23  1:10  1:40  1:32  1:36  1:23 
Sleep  8:15  8:24  7:58  7:52  8:11  7:53 
Meals, personal care  2:31  2:58  2:52  2:05  1:55  1:58 
Free time, incl. unspecified  4:20  3:51  4:07  4:51  4:42  5:38 
Total  24  24  24  24  24  24 
 
Source: Aliaga 2006. 
Note: The average time is calculated for the group of all employed persons, and for the whole year including working days and 




These data suggest a correlation between the status of women and men in society 
and in the family, on the one hand, and fertility, on the other, around the turn of the 
century in Western Europe. In the Scandinavian countries, where women are involved 
in many spheres of public life and many of them are gainfully employed, and where 
men  share  quite  a  considerable  amount  of  household  responsibilities,  fertility  is 
relatively high, close to replacement levels (Oláh and Bernhardt 2008). In contrast, in 
the Mediterranean countries where women’s involvement in public life is rising but still 
rare, where lesser proportions of women are gainfully employed, and where patriarchal 
relationships are still quite prevalent in the family, fertility is very low, considerably 
below replacement rates (De Rose et al. 2008, Delgado et al. 2008). 
Summing up this section on Western Europe, we can observe that, towards the end 
of the 20
th century, there were many circumstances making it relatively difficult for Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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young  people  to  establish  families  and  to  have  children.  The  situation  was  very 
heterogeneous, with national period fertility rates in 1990 ranging from 1.3 in Italy and 
1.4  in  Spain,  to  2.1  in  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Ireland.  This  reflects  the  numerous 
differences  in  the  micro  and  macro  conditions  that  were  instrumental  in  shaping 
people’s childbearing behaviour. 
Compared to generations of young people in the 1960s and 1970s, young people in 
the West in the 1990s spent several more years on average acquiring education. Once 
they  finished  school,  it  was  more  difficult  for  them  to  find  employment,  and  the 
employment they found was, moreover, less secure than it used to be. It was also more 
expensive to secure a place to live independently. Much higher proportions of women 
were studying at the secondary and especially at the tertiary levels, and larger shares of 
women were gainfully employed. At the same time, however, women retained prime 
responsibilities for maintaining households and bringing up children. The duration of 
partnership arrangements --marriages and consensual unions-- became less predictable 
and  increasingly  uncertain.  Also,  modern  contraceptive  means  and  liberal  abortion 
legislation  made  it  easier  to  prevent  unwanted  and  unplanned  births  (Hobcraft  and 
Kiernan 1995; Lesthaeghe and Moors. 2000). 
 
 
4. Central and Eastern Europe  
In the immediate post-war period, there was a tendency for fertility to increase in the 
majority of the Central and Eastern European countries. Within a few years, by the late 
1940s and early 1950s, fertility started to decline, and this descent was sustained into 
the  1960s.  While  fertility  was  increasing  and  the  baby  boom  was  taking  place  in 
Western Europe, fertility in Central and Eastern European countries was on the decline, 
reaching below replacement levels in a number of countries in the 1960s. Arguably the 
development strategies adopted by the state socialist governments were the main cause. 
The central emphasis was on major investments in heavy industries, while consumer 
industries, housing and services were neglected. Rapid growth of industrial capacity 
was  achieved  without  sufficient  advances  in  technologies,  and  with  relatively  low 
productivity, creating an environment of high demand for labour. Male labour force 
participation  rates  were  already  high,  and  so  the  gap  was  filled  by  unprecedented 
increases in female employment. Moreover, women’s employment was promoted on 
ideological grounds as a basis for gender equality. As a result, in Czechoslovakia, for 
example, the proportion of women in their prime childbearing years (ages 20-30) in the 
labour force increased from 30 percent in 1950 to 60 percent by 1961 (Frejka 1980). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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The implementation of liberal induced abortion legislation in the  mid-1950s in 
almost all Central and Eastern European countries contributed to the ongoing fertility 
decline (Frejka 1983). It was frequently modified and often moderately restricted, but, 
with the notable exception of Romania, access to induced abortion remained in place 
throughout the state socialist period.  
Fertility rates increased in several countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and 
stabilized  at  close  to  the  replacement  level  in  almost  all  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European countries during the 1970s and 1980s. The basic demographic mechanism 
underlying this fertility level and its stability was universal and early marriage, a low 
age of childbearing with low rates of childlessness, and high rates of first and second 
births. Societal circumstances underpinning this demographic regime were generated 
and sustained by the following factors (Frejka 1980; Sobotka 2004, chapter 8): 
 
A. Predominantly pro-natalist social and population policies, 
B. The centrally planned economic system and the socialist welfare state, and 
C. A tight authoritarian political system 
 
 
A. Predominantly pro-natalist social and population policies  
Governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe became gravely concerned about 
the declining and low fertility rates of the 1960s (Macura 1981). This was unexpected 
and  contrary  to  theoretical  and  ideological  expectations  (Besemeres  1980).  Under 
socialism, population was supposed to grow as an expression of the system’s strength 
and superiority relative to capitalism. Yet population growth was faster and fertility 
levels were higher in the Western capitalist countries. Another reason for concern was 
the prospect that future generations of young women and men would be too small in 
numbers to replenish the armed forces and the labour force. Throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe, social and population policies of a predominantly pro-natalist nature 
were devised and implemented during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Stefanov and 
Naoumov 1974, Ziolkowksi 1974, Frejka 1980, Macura 1981, Büttner and Lutz 1990, 
Kamaras 1996). By and large, these policies generated some of the desired results, and 
thus  brought  about  moderate  fertility  increases.  These  policies  were  continuously 
updated  and  modified  during  the  1970s  and 1980s,  and played  a  role  in  sustaining 
fertility at around replacement levels.  
The pro-natalist policy measures varied widely, and differed from one country to 
another. They ranged from various types of financial aid to individuals and families, to Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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the establishment of a network of institutions serving families, to preferential access to 
housing for young families with children. 
The financial aid to families consisted of grants provided at the birth of a child, 
child allowances up to a certain age, payments during relatively extended maternity 
leaves, income tax credits, and loans to young couples with favourable terms, such as a 
provision that a specified amount would be written off upon the birth of a child. The 
principal  component  of  the  institutional  networks  aiding  families  were  crèches, 
nurseries and kindergartens. In addition, older children could stay in school after regular 
classes,  and  school  meals  and  children’s  clothing  were  subsidized.  These  outlays 
amounted to a significant redistribution of income, i.e., they resulted in a considerable 
lowering of the costs of childbearing and child raising
5  (David and McIntyre 1981, 
Frejka 1980).  
The  administration  of  housing  policies  was  a  crucial  element  of  social  and 
population policies. Much of the housing stock was state owned and in short supply. To 
a large extent, access to housing was not governed by the market but by administrative 
decisions of the government bureaucracy. Young people advanced on waiting lists for 
housing if they got married and had a child or two. The prospect of gaining access to 
housing was among the incentives to marry and have a child while young. Starting a 
family  was  also  a  feasible  route  for  young  people  to  leave  the  parental  home  and 
become independent (Frejka 1980, Sobotka 2004). 
Sex education was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, mostly in support of the 
pro-natalist policies in the form of education for marriage and parenthood. Biological 
aspects of sex were included in natural science lessons on human anatomy, physiology 
and  hygiene  for  8-  to  15-year-olds.  The  classes  were  usually  taught  by  school 
physicians, which meant that the health aspects were emphasized, while contraceptive 
education  and  many  of  the  broader  aspects  of  partner  relationships  were  neglected 
(Stloukal 1999).  
Extensive reliance on induced abortion, widespread use of inefficient traditional 
means of contraception, and a lack of modern contraceptive methods were the basic 
characteristics  of  practices  directly  affecting  birth  regulating  behaviour  (see  also 
Overview  Chapter  3).  The  state  socialist  policies  in  this  area  originated  in  the 
substantial  liberalization  of  abortion  legislation  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  1955. 
Presumably, the rationale was derived as much from concerns about public health as 
from ideological considerations (Frejka 1983). Some scholars interpreted this decision 
                                                            
5 In Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s these disbursements amounted to about ten percent of total government 
expenditures (Frejka 1980). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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as an expression of sensitivity to current social problems in the initial years of the post-
Stalinist era (Besemeres 1980). The reliance on induced abortion, combined  mainly 
with coitus interruptus, developed as the fertility regulation norm in CEE countries 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was before the introduction of hormonal 
contraception and before the widespread use of IUDs and sterilization during the 1960s 
and subsequent years in the West (Westoff and Ryder 1977). 
As a rule, governments in Central and Eastern Europe opposed the diffusion of 
hormonal contraception for a number of reasons, some of them publicly enunciated and 
purposefully promulgated, especially among physicians, but also among the  general 
public. It was claimed that the risks to women’s health associated with oral hormonal 
contraceptives and IUDs by far outweighed the benefits. Thus, doctors did not promote 
modern contraception, and the public was suspicious of these methods and did not seek 
them  out.  Also,  because  governments  imposed  restrictions  on  their  importation  and 
domestic production, modern contraceptives were practically unobtainable and in short 
supply.  In  some  countries,  access  to  contraceptives  was  deliberately  circumscribed 
based on pro-natalist intentions of raising fertility (Stloukal 1995). The fact that modern 
contraceptives were developed and widely used in the capitalist West made them, by 
definition, unsuitable for use in socialist countries. Nonetheless, the situation was very 
different from one country to another. For example, authorities in Hungary, the German 
Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia made the contraceptive pill generally available 
and  encouraged  the  use  of  modern  contraceptives  (see  also  contributions  in  David 
1999). In 1977, the pill was used by 55 percent of all users in Hungary, compared to 10 
percent and 3 percent in Poland and Bulgaria, respectively (Frejka 1983). 
 
 
B. The centrally planned economic system and the socialist welfare state  
The socialist  welfare state and the lack of  market  forces operating in the economy 
provided further favourable circumstances for childbearing, but also contained several 
elements that tended to discourage people from having children.  
Young people lived in a relatively risk-free environment, created by virtually free 
education,  free  health  care  and  guaranteed  employment.  Full  employment  and  the 
obligation  of  all  working  age  population  to  study  or  be  employed  were  considered 
incontrovertible. The inefficient functioning of state-owned enterprises created a large 
demand for labour, which made full employment possible. Moreover, workers often 
lacked motivation to work to their full potential, thus reinforcing the inefficiency of the Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
152    http://www.demographic-research.org 
economy (Table 5). Consequently, job security, which was a related, proclaimed goal of 
the socialist system, was guaranteed.  
 
 
Table 5:  Population, gross domestic product, and GDP per head in Europe  
    and the former Soviet Union 1950 and 2001 
 
Population (millions)  GDP (billion dollars)  GDP per head (dollars) 
Region  1950  2001 
2001/ 
1950  1950  2001 
2001/ 
1950  1950  2001 
2001/ 
1950 
Western Europe  304.9  392.1  1.3  1,396  7,550  5.4  4,579  19,256  4.2 
Central & 
Eastern Europe  87.6  120.9  1.4  185  729  3.9  2,111  6,027  2.9 
Former Soviet 
Union  179.6  120.9  1.6  510  1,343  2.6  2,841  4,626   1.6 
 
Source: Demeny and McNicoll 2006. 
 
 
A crude measure of the inefficiency of centrally planned economies in contrast to 
Western economies is expressed by the comparative  growth of the respective  gross 
domestic products and GDP/capita during the second half of the 20
th century.
6 GDP in 
Central  and  Eastern  European  (CEE)  countries  increased  by  a  factor  of  3.9  times 
between 1950 and 2001, compared to an increase by a factor of 5.4 times in Western 
Europe (WE). In addition, per capita income grew at a slower rate in the CEE countries 
compared to WE, so that the gap between them increased. In 1950, per capita income in 
the West was more than twice that of the CEE countries; in 2001, the difference was 
more than threefold. The respective differences between the former Soviet Union and 
WE  were  even  greater.  Moreover,  the  desire  for  consumer  goods  was  growing  in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  but  remained  far  from  satisfied.  The  inefficient, 
technologically lagging economies did not produce sufficient quantities of consumer 
goods,  and,  in  addition,  many  people  operated  with  a  limited  purchasing  capacity 
(Table 5). There were long waiting lists for household appliances and furniture, and 
                                                            
6 The period 1950-2001 includes the transition years of the1990s. A comparison of these indicators for the 
years 1950-1990 would be slightly more favourable for the former state-socialist countries, due to the 
economic crisis experienced during that period in most of these countries, but the basic conclusion would be 
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people  often  had  to  wait  for  years  to  purchase  motor  vehicles  of  inferior  quality 
(Kotowska et al. 2008). 
The high demand for labour continued to require that ever growing proportions of 
women join the labour force. The desire to secure an acceptable standard of living by 
earning a second income motivated women to seek gainful employment. Practically all 
women of working age were employed. Their labour force participation rates reached 
levels almost as high as those of men, particularly if women on maternity leave are 
taken into account.   
Officially, the high female employment rates were heralded as proof of women 
having achieved equal rights with men. In reality, women became overburdened. The 
traditional division of responsibilities in the  household remained almost  unchanged. 
Women  had  to  maintain  households  and  raise  children  under  rather  unfavourable 
conditions,  which  frequently  included  shortages  of  consumer  goods,  inadequate 
services,  a  lack  of  labour-saving  household  appliances,  difficulties  with  child-care 
facilities and, in some cases, inferior housing. Several surveys of the 1960s documented 
that women’s household duties took up almost as much time as their jobs, leaving only 
seven or eight hours a day for other activities, including eating and sleeping (Frejka 
1980). 
A  lack  of  competition  and  the  inefficient  economy  did  not  require  a  highly 
technically  qualified  work  force,  and  egalitarian  principles  were  overriding  market 
forces  in  the  demand  for  labour,  and  in  determining  wage  levels.  Occupations  that 
required advanced education were often rewarded equally, or even less than, manual 
labour. Physicians earned as much or less than bus drivers and miners. Altogether, there 
was not much motivation to acquire an advanced education. Compared to the West, 
smaller proportions of young people were enrolled in institutions of higher learning, 
and both the quality and the relative size of these institutions lagged behind the West. 
On average, the part of the life cycle spent in school was shorter in CEE countries than 
in WE countries. 
 
 
C. A tight authoritarian political system  
Many aspects of citizen’s private life were closely watched by the authorities. It was 
unacceptable  to  deviate  from  the  official  political  ideology  and  positions.  A  strong 
security apparatus was maintained to keep people in line. Outside of the family and a 
circle  of  close  friends,  people  did  not  know  who  could  be  trusted.  The  family 
environment became a safe haven.  Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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There was a major effort to keep the citizenry in isolation from the outside world 
in order to prevent the infiltration of ideas from abroad. Travel to the West was severely 
restricted.  Authorities  were  also  reluctant  to  let  people  travel  to  some  of  the  other 
Central and Eastern European countries for fear that liberal ideas or movements could 
spread. In some countries, people did not have the right to own passports, and for each 
trip, especially to the West, an exit visa was required. In any case, most people could 
not afford to travel abroad given their relatively low incomes (cf. Table 5). Moreover, 
currencies of the state socialist countries  were not officially convertible to Western 
currencies.  For  the  most  part,  it  was  very  expensive  for  normal  citizens  to  acquire 
Western currency, and currency exchanges  were mainly  done illegally on the black 
market. 
Isolation  was  severely  enforced  in  limiting  contacts  of  scientists  with  their 
counterparts  in  the  West.  Many  scientific  advances  developed  in  Western  countries 
were deemed suspicious and labelled as bourgeois. This was also the fate of progress 
achieved  in  human  reproductive  physiology  and  the  development  of  modern 
contraceptives. 
The degree to which cultural life and leisure activities were constrained by the 
authorities also differed very much between countries. In some countries, and during 
some  periods,  a  certain  amount  of  freedom  and  creativity  were  tolerated.  But,  in 
general, attractive opportunities to spend meaningful time outside the household were 
relatively few, the burdens of domestic chores in addition to work were substantial, and, 
given the relatively low incomes, only limited financial resources were available for 
these activities in any case. 
In sum, the various countervailing forces in the state socialist countries of Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  created  a  relatively  favourable 
childbearing  environment  that  resulted  in  a  widespread  prevalence  of  the  two-child 
family (cf. overview chapter 2). There was remarkably little variation between CEE 
countries in terms of period total fertility rates, and there was a conspicuous absence in 
these countries of fertility postponement that was taking place in other parts of Europe. 
In the majority of CEE countries, the TFR in 1989 was between 1.9 and 2.1. In a few of 
these countries, the TFR was at 1.8 or less (Hungary [1.8], Croatia [1.7] and Slovenia 
[1.5]), while at the other “extreme” it was 2.2 or more (Estonia [2.2], Moldova [2.5] and 
Romania [2.2]) (Council of Europe 2006). 
On balance, the socialist welfare state provided reasonably predictable and reliable 
risk-free conditions for family life and childbearing based on guaranteed employment, 
job security, free education and free health care. Couples received direct financial aid 
(birth grants, child allowances, paid maternity leave, etc.) and benefited indirectly by Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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sending their children to a crèche or kindergarten, receiving free school meals and after-
school child care, and by buying subsidized clothing and school equipment. The usual 
route for young people to acquire a home was to get married and have a child. It could 
take a long time to gain access to housing, but the cost of maintaining a home was low 
because rents were state-subsidized. Various other circumstances indirectly contributed 
to  early  childbearing,  such  as  limited  career  options,  restricted  choice  of  leisure 
activities, lack of travel opportunities, and a deficient supply of large-item consumer 
goods, especially cars. The fact that most women were gainfully employed, yet still 
burdened  by  difficult  household  maintenance  and  childrearing  duties,  acted  as 
deterrents to having a larger number of children. 
 
 
5. The contemporary historical context  
By the end of the 1980s, the shortcomings of the state  socialist systems in Europe 
became so acute that the regimes imploded. For a few years under the reform-minded 
leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, there was an attempt to cure the existing system from 
within through economic reforms (“perestroika”) and some liberalization of the political 
structures and conditions (“glasnost”). The general malfunctioning of the system had 
become so untenable and the discontent of the populations of the CEE countries had 
become  so  severe  that  the  authoritarian  governments  collapsed  despite  the  reform 
efforts, and new governments sprang up. The primary policies of these governments 
were  to  restructure  economies  and  reform  state  institutions  based  on  the  principles 
inherent in the Western countries. In other words, following the collapse of the state 
socialist regimes, a full-fledged transition to capitalist political and economic conditions 
ensued. The process was modified by the specific conditions of each country and thus 
varied considerably, but, essentially, the social, economic and political conditions of the 
Western countries were being adopted in CEE countries, and people adjusted to these 
new conditions. This was true as much for family formation and childbearing as for any 
other aspect of life. 
The transition, i.e., the implementation of the Western societal conditions, turned 
out to be complex, and was more or less painful in various countries and for various 
strata  of  the  populations  of  these  countries  (cf.  all  CEE  country  chapters).  The 
conditions in the labour market changed rapidly as enterprises became concerned with 
productivity and profitability. Employment was no longer guaranteed and job security 
ceased. Employment conditions became particularly difficult for women. Demand for 
highly  qualified  positions  increased,  which  required  a  well  educated  work  force. Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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Institutions of higher learning expanded rapidly, as did tertiary and secondary school 
enrolment  rates.  Professional  and  leisure  time  opportunities  became  numerous,  and 
young  people  started  to  take  advantage  of  them.  Many  of  the  entitlements  of  the 
previous  socialist  welfare  state  were  curtailed  or  disappeared  altogether.  Modern 
contraceptives  became  readily  available,  and,  for  the  most  part,  access  to  induced 
abortion was retained (see overview chapter 3). 
Family  formation  and  childbearing  patterns  adjusted  to  the  rapidly  changing 
societal environment. Exit from the parental home, union formation and childbearing 
were being postponed, various forms of partnership arrangements became acceptable, 
and cohabitation became more popular (see overview chapter 4). The transformation of 
family formation and reproductive behaviour in the CEE countries can best be observed 
by looking at the changing fertility age patterns of successive cohorts. 
 
 
6. Effects of changing cohort fertility age patterns  
At  the  time  of  the  collapse  of  the  state  socialist  system,  the  changes  in  fertility 
behaviour affected by the political changes of distinct generations depended largely 
upon their respective ages (Figure 1). 
Those born in or prior to the early 1960s were affected only marginally by the 
system  transition  because  they  had  already  completed  a  major  part  of  their  family 
formation and childbearing prior to the central turning point around 1990. They had 
their children early, and, by their late 20s, they had almost completed their childbearing. 
Those born in the late 1960s were in the midst of their childbearing at the time 
when the state socialist system collapsed, and some of them adopted strategies that 
differed from those of previous generations. Nonetheless, these cohorts had started their 
childbearing under the socialist conditions. By their early 20s, they had already borne a 
considerable share of the total number of children they were likely to have. The effect 
of the transition was still not very large. 
Those born in the early 1970s were starting out in their childbearing careers when 
communism fell apart, and their family formation and childbearing patterns differed 
significantly from those of previous cohorts (See the 1975 cohorts in Figure 1). They 
had fewer births when in their teens and early twenties, and they were starting to delay 
childbearing. 
Finally, those born in the late 1970s and early 1980s entered adulthood in the 
rapidly changing societal environment. To date, their childbearing behaviour has been Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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very different from that of previous cohorts, with sharply lower fertility while young 
and with a strong propensity to postpone fertility.  
The  varying  childbearing  behaviour  of  the  respective  cohorts  is  a  crucial 
circumstance contributing to the very low fertility rates of the mid- to late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The birth cohorts of the 1950s and early 1960s had essentially completed 
their childbearing by that time. Almost all of their children had been born by the early 
1990s. On the other hand, many potential parents of the cohorts born during the 1970s 
and early 1980s were delaying childbearing until their late twenties or early thirties, and 
thus were not bearing many children during the mid- to late 1990s. Because the former 
cohorts were no longer having children in the mid- to late 1990s, and the latter cohorts 
were just gradually starting their childbearing, period fertility was at its lowest. 
Let us take one specific example using first births only. The childbearing trajectory 
of the 1975 birth cohort in  Hungary  was  much  lower than that of the 1970 cohort 
(Figure 1, Panel B). At age 20, the ASFR in the 1975 cohort was almost the same as the 
ASFR at age 25 in the 1970 cohort. The respective cross-section sums of the cohort 
age-specific fertility rates of first births for calendar years illustrate the considerable 
changes that were taking place. The first birth period total fertility rate (PTFR) for the 
year 2002 was about 0.58, compared to 0.64 for the year 1995, and close to 0.82 in 
1990. Starting in the mid- to late 2000s, the PTFRs are likely to increase as age patterns 
of childbearing in a growing number of birth cohorts start to resemble each other. The 
confluence of low fertility at different ages in the reproductive cycle will fade away. 
During the political and economic transition, childbearing strategies were changing 
rapidly from one generation to the next. The general patterns of change were common 
to all the CEE countries. The direction of change is clear, but it is too early to know 
what the future general age pattern will be, or whether there will be major inter-country 
differences. One thing is, however, certain: early childbearing, which peaked around 
age 20 with most children born while women were in their twenties, is a matter of the 
past.  
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Figure 1:  First birth cohort age-specific fertility rates
a, birth cohorts  
  1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland  
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Source: Observatoire Démographique Européen, 2006. 
Note: a – Incidence rates, i.e., rates of the second kind. Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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7. Understanding the causes of the fertility and family formation 
changes during the 1990s and beyond  
Given the magnitude and the velocity of the changes in fertility and family formation, a 
number of scholars have grappled with the challenge of understanding and describing 
the mechanisms and causes of these processes (cf., for example, Rychtaříková 1996 and 
1999, Rabušic 2001, Kotowska & Jóźwiak, eds. 2003). As Sobotka (2004) and others 
(e.g., Philipov 2003, Philipov and Dorbritz 2003) have pointed out, attempts to decipher 
the  main  determinants  of  the  fertility  declines  of  the  1990s  were  centred  on  two 
theories. The first saw the economic and social crisis of the early 1990s as the principal 
cause of the respective fertility and family formation trends. The other regarded the 
diffusion  of  cultural  and  ideational  developments--namely,  the  adoption  of  new, 
Western  norms,  values  and  attitudes--as  the  main  stimulants  for  the  demographic 
changes. Many authors also recognized that both sets of determinants played crucial 
roles,  with  the  former  being  more  important  early  in  the  transformation  process 
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002).  
Analyses  in  the  country  chapters  of  this  project  have  shown  that  such  a 
dichotomization between the ‘crisis’ and the ‘cultural and ideational diffusion’ theories 
is a simplification and can lead to confusion, even if both were considered to have 
operated simultaneously. In addition to the economic crisis factors that impinged on 
childbearing decisions, a new set of economic factors previously unknown in the state 
socialist economies emerged, namely, the type that evolve naturally as part of the shift 
towards a market economy, such as competition in the labour market, job insecurity and 
rising costs of children. The nature of these factors is primarily economic, yet they do 
not  fit  into  the  category  of  either  ‘crisis’  or  ‘cultural  and  ideational’  factors.  This 
suggests  that  neither  of  these  theories  defines  the  root  cause  of  the  demographic 
changes taking place in the CEE countries during the 1990s and the early 21
st century.  
However obvious and simplistic it may appear, the replacement of the state socialist 
regimes by market economies and by fledgling democratic institutions of governance is 
the root cause of the demographic changes and trends during the transition period and 
beyond. 
The  crux  of  the  matter  is  that  the  economic  and  political  infrastructure  of 
contemporary  capitalism  is  being  adopted.  The  family  formation  and  childbearing 
environment is undergoing radical change as previous conditions are replaced by the 
respective  conditions  prevalent  in  the  West.  In  individual  countries,  specific 
institutional conditions and the character of family policies and welfare support may 
differ as much as they currently differ in other regions of Europe. It is still unclear Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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whether these conditions and policies will come to resemble the Scandinavian, French, 
British, Dutch, Central European Germanic or Mediterranean types.   
The  conditions  which  were  generally  conducive  for  childbearing,  such  as  job 
security,  low-cost  housing,  free  education,  free  health  care,  various  entitlements 
associated with child birth and childrearing, as well as a lack of career opportunities and 
leisure activities;  were replaced by the considerably  more restraining conditions  for 
childbearing  of  job  insecurity,  an  increasing  pressure  to  acquire  more  education, 
expensive housing, lesser and declining birth and childrearing entitlements, as well as 
the availability of a variety of career opportunities, consumption attractions and leisure 
activities.  The  citizenry  of  the  state  socialist  countries  had  grown  accustomed  to  a 
relatively care-free existence, although the standard living conditions were worse than 
in the Western countries, and there were numerous unpleasant concomitants to this life-
style. All of a sudden, people were submerged into societal conditions which made it 
more difficult to earn a living, and under which various costs previously borne by the 
paternalistic state became the responsibility of individuals and families. 
This broader explanation does not deny the validity of the ‘crisis’ or the ‘cultural 
and ideational’ theories. Both are inherent in the ‘root cause’ explanation. The change 
of the economic systems in the early 1990s generated severe economic crises often 
accompanied by hyper-inflation and high unemployment rates. These, in turn, led to a 
diminution  of  incentives  and  growth  of  constraints  on  childbearing.  The  radical 
overhaul of the economic, political and social infrastructure was the basis for emerging 
changes  in  the  value  systems,  norms  and  attitudes  regarding  family  formation  and 
childbearing. The diffusion of western norms, values and attitudes proceeded because a 
corresponding economic, political and social infrastructure was emerging. 
A  number  of  the  analyses  in  the  CEE  chapters  in  this  book  conclude  that 
predominantly economic determinants, rather than ideational ones, were the overriding 
factors contributing to the fertility decline (e.g., Poland and Lithuania). At the same 
time,  however,  to  date  there  has  been  the  general  perception  that  the  only  two 
explanatory frameworks for the fertility trends were the ‘crisis’ and the ‘cultural and 
ideational’ theories. Thus, by default, economic determinants were understood to fall 
into the ‘crisis’ category. By identifying the replacement of the socialist economic and 
political system with the capitalist system as the principal explanation – indeed, the root 
cause – of the contemporary demographic trends, it becomes clear that the observed 
economic determinants could be signs of emerging market economy conditions which 
are no longer associated with the initial crisis conditions. 
In the Poland chapter it is argued “that for demographic behaviours observed in the 
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economic restrictions and incentives than it did in [Western] developed countries. … 
[I]deational  change  has  not  advanced  until  recently  [in  Poland]  compared  with  its 
progress  in  other  European  countries”  (Kotowska  et  al.  2008:845).  In  the  Slovenia 
chapter  (Stropnik  and  Šircelj  2008:1038)  it  is  stated  that  “the  surveys  and  public 
discussions in Slovenia repeatedly prove that young people would have children earlier 
if the two basic preconditions, i.e., a stable job and appropriate housing, were fulfilled”. 
Similarly, in the case of Bulgaria, “Koytcheva (2006) finds that during the 1990s the 
changes in fertility in Bulgaria were influenced to a higher degree by economic factors 
than by changes in values and ideas” (Koytcheva and Philipov 2008:392). 
Other  authors  have  de  facto  acknowledged  the  root  cause  explanation.  For 
instance, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002) summarizing their findings on new patterns of 
household formation in CEE countries stated inter alia: 
“In  short,  a  capitalist  restructuring  leads  to  greater  individual  autonomy  in  the 
ideational sphere, and this in turn means more convergence of family formation patterns 
to western types. Rather than the economic crisis per se, it is the entire restructuring of 
society that is the accelerator of the ideational and demographic changes.” 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging that “there is nothing mutually exclusive about 
the operation of both economic and cultural factors” and that “they may be interwoven 
and mutually reinforcing,” Lesthaeghe and Surkyn believe that, in the long run, the 
cultural factors will become dominant and will eventually “take over.” 
 
 
8. The array of specific factors as identified in country analyses  
In the country analyses, numerous specific factors causing and modifying demographic 
behaviour  in  the  transition  countries  have  been  identified  and  discussed.  These  are 
listed because they demonstrate the wide variety of circumstances that played a role. 
The interplay of these factors was somewhat different from one country to another, and, 
therefore,  some  are  discussed  in  almost  all  CEE  country  chapters,  while  others  are 
mentioned  only  in  a  few.  While  some  of  these  factors  were  predominantly  of  an 
economic nature, others were mainly social, cultural, psychological, or political. Due to 
the  instantaneous  and  rapid  change  from  the  state  socialist  to  the  capitalist  system, 
particular conditions had an immediate forceful impact, while other factors are of a 
long-lasting nature. Thus, the economic factors are listed in two general categories: 
those  operating  mainly  during  the  initial  crisis  years,  and  the  long-term  factors 
associated with the development of market economies.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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8.1 Economic factors operating mainly during the initial years of the transition  
•  Massive inflation;  
•  Considerable unemployment, in particular among women;  
•  The  loss  of  previously  guaranteed  rights  and  entitlements,  particularly 
guaranteed employment and income, as well as the loss of free education and 
free health care in some countries;  
•  A decline in social functions and services provided by companies – e.g., health 
clinics, cafeteria and child day care facilities; 
•  A decline in real income of individuals and households; a delay in payment or 
non-payment  of  earned  wages  and  salaries  in  a  number  of  countries;  the 
requirement that some employees take unpaid leave, often of long duration; 
•  Increasing  levels  of  discrimination  against  women  in  the  economy,  in 
particular in the job market;  
•  Declining capacity/supply of public child care facilities, especially for children 
0-2 years old;  
•  A lack of housing coupled with increasing costs of housing; lack of credit 
opportunities, particularly for young people; 
•  Increasing disparities in the income distribution, with some segments of the 
population  becoming  impoverished  while  others  became  more  affluent  and 
acquired wealth; 
•  A state of deprivation and anomie in some segments of the population. 
 
 
8.2 Economic factors associated with the development of market economies 
•  A  restructuring  of  the  market  with  an  increasing  availability  of  consumer 
goods and services; 
•  A tightening job market and growing degree of labour market competition that 
resulted  in  an  increase  in  required  qualifications,  and  which,  in  turn, 
necessitated the acquisition of appropriate skills; 
•  Rising job insecurity;  
•  New career opportunities, especially for individuals with higher education;  
•  Rising  direct  costs  for  child  care,  education  and  health,  an  increasing 
proportion of which had to be borne by users;  
•  Rising indirect costs of children. Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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8.3 Social, cultural and psychological factors  
•  Changing  norms,  values  and  attitudes  regarding  marriage,  cohabitation, 
separation,  divorce,  extra-marital  childbearing,  modern  contraception  (see 
overview chapter 6); 
•  A  largely  continuing  traditional  perception  of  gender  roles  in  the  family, 
although a more egalitarian modern perception is also starting to spread;  
•  Continued  unequal  division  of  responsibilities  and  work  within  households 
between genders (shopping, maintenance, child care, laundry, cooking, etc.); 
•  Continuing or further deepening marriage and union instability; 
•  Significantly  enhanced  access  to,  and  increasing  utilization  of,  modern 
contraception; 
•  Temporary  and  permanent  emigration  for  work-  and  study-  generated 
income/remittances,  but  with  an  accompanying  destabilization  of  family 
relations; 
•  Amplified social stratification with more pronounced differences between the 
lower, middle and upper strata; 
•  A massive expansion of education, especially at the tertiary level; 
•  An expansion of consumerist behaviour; 
•  Increased opportunities in education, leisure activities and international travel. 
 
 
8.4 Political factors  
•  A  disarray  in  family  policies;  no  clear  family  policy  goals  and  strategies; 
curtailed family policy benefits; 
•  Legalization of induced abortion in Albania and Romania; 
•  Severe restriction of abortion legislation in Poland, and the possibility of some 
restrictions in other countries. 
 
There are no definite dividing lines between the two types of economic factors. For 
example, the fact that various types of educational, health and child care costs borne by 
the state under the socialist regimes became the responsibility of the family might have 
initially  been  perceived  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  crisis  determinants.  In  a  market 
economy, however, it is natural that some of these costs are mainly the responsibility of 
households, although specific policy measures can mitigate their burden.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
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In  some  of  the  country  chapters,  the  discrimination  against  women  and  the 
continued  unequal  division  of  responsibilities  and  work  within  households  between 
genders  are  considered  important  circumstances  curtailing  childbearing.  “Female 
emancipation during the years of transformation progressed in a highly controversial 
way in Lithuania. It was, and still is, developing, along with the preservation of the 
traditional/patriarchal attitudes towards gender roles …. Society’s delay in adapting to 
the new female roles forces women to work out certain new strategies, which they use 
to the best of their needs and abilities, to solve the problem of reconciling the varied 
challenges  of  daily  life.  They  postpone  childbearing  for  a  later  period,  have  fewer 
children,  or  refuse  to  have  children  altogether”  (Stankuniene  and  Jasilioniene 
2008:731). “In Slovenia, the traditional gender division of roles in the family persists, 
leading  to  a  double  burden  for  employed  women.  Having  less  children  may  thus 
constitute a coping strategy for young women” (Stropnik and Šircelj 2008:1039). A 
peculiar  perception  on  gender  roles  exists  in  the  Czech  Republic.  “The  continuing 
inequality in the gender division of housework has been documented in a number of 
research studies.  …  Czech women contribute two thirds of the total time necessary for 
doing the housework  … Interestingly, even women who work full-time, as do their 
partners, opine that it is fair to work more in the home than their partners” (Sobotka et 
al. 2008:438).  
Ukraine and the Czech Republic are vivid examples of how different the transition 
experience was in individual countries. According to the Ukraine chapter, “[a]fter the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine experienced a grave economic crisis, leading 
to  individual  level  economic  uncertainty”  (Perelli-Harris  2008:1162).    …  “This 
instability has led to social anomie, or a breakdown in social norms …  The negative 
change has caused individuals to feel they have lost control over their lives, resulting in 
high levels of stress and anxiety” … “Social anomie, as opposed to simple economic 
uncertainty, may be one of the main reasons for the rapid decline in fertility in Ukraine” 
(Perelli-Harris. 2008:1163). The country chapters on Russia (Zakharov 2008), Romania 
(Muresan et al. 2008) and Bulgaria (Koytcheva and Philipov 2008) provide evidence of 
similar developments in those countries. 
In contrast, in the Czech Republic “extreme shocks or turbulence as experienced in 
many other post-communist societies” were avoided. “Thanks to the existence of an 
extensive social security net, combined with a rapid expansion of small enterprises, the 
economic transformation did not entail severe consequences for the  majority of the 
population” (Sobotka et al. 2008:404). However, the Czech Republic also experienced a 
considerable fertility decline during the 1990s. “The rapidity of observed changes can 
be explained as the outcome of a simultaneous occurrence of several factors, especially Frejka: Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing in CEE  
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the expansion of higher education, the emergence of new opportunities competing with 
family life, increasing job competition, rising economic uncertainty in young adulthood, 
and changing partnership behaviour” (Sobotka et al. 2008:403). Apparently Slovenia 




9. Conclusions  
By historical standards, the rapid changes in family formation and childbearing levels in 
the CEE countries during the 1990s were unprecedented. To date, two theories have 
been elaborated to provide an understanding of the determinants that brought about 
these trends. The first theory argues that the economic and social crises which occurred 
in the wake of the transition from the state socialist centrally managed economies to 
capitalist market economies in the early 1990s were the principal causes of the rapid 
demographic  changes.  The  other  theory  claims  that  it  was  the  diffusion  of  western 
norms,  values  and  attitudes  regarding  family  formation  and  childbearing  that  were 
instrumental in causing the observed demographic trends. The two theories were not 
considered mutually exclusive, and it was accepted that the economic crisis and the 
diffusion factors could be operating simultaneously. 
Both  theories  make  valid  observations,  but  they  do  not  reveal  the  principal 
underlying or root cause of the respective demographic trends, namely, the replacement 
of  the  state  socialist  regimes  by  market  economies  and  by  fledgling  democratic 
institutions of governance. The former created the relatively favourable conditions for 
childbearing of job security, low-cost housing, free education, free health care, and a 
variety of entitlements associated with child birth and childrearing, as well as shortages 
of career opportunities, leisure activities, and consumer goods. These were replaced by 
the more restraining conditions for childbearing of job insecurity, an increasing pressure 
to  acquire  more  education,  expensive  housing,  lesser  and  declining  birth  and 
childrearing entitlements, as well as the availability of a variety of career opportunities, 
leisure activities and consumer goods. The populace of the CEE countries had grown 
accustomed  to  the  socialist  paternalistic  welfare  state  circumstances  over  several 
decades, and, all of a sudden, young people were confronted with the need to deal with 
a whole new Western type of family formation and childbearing environment. Market 
economy principles and Western democratic institutions provided the framework for 
family formation and childbearing, and they also provided the basis for the adoption Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 7 
http://www.demographic-research.org  167 
and  diffusion  of  western  type  norms,  values  and  attitudes  regarding  demographic 
behaviour. 
Individual generations were affected by the changing incentives and constraints on 
childbearing  in  very  different  ways.  This  turned  out  to  reinforce  the  declines  and 
extraordinarily low levels of the period total fertility rates during the 1990s. The birth 
cohorts of the 1960s had borne almost all their children when in their twenties, and, 
consequently, had very low fertility rates when in their thirties, i.e. during the 1990s. In 
contrast, the birth cohorts of the mid- to late 1970s were delaying many births into their 
late  twenties  and  thirties,  and  thus  had  low  fertility  when  starting  out  on  their 
childbearing careers during the 1990s. Thus the low fertility rates of the former when 
ending their childbearing overlapped with the relatively low fertility rates of the latter 
when they were in the initial years of childbearing, resulting in the total period fertility 
rates of around 1.1 to 1.3 births per woman observed around the year 2000 in most 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the foreseeable future, cohorts with similar 
age patterns of childbearing will, in all likelihood, overlap. This fact alone is likely to 
cause an increase in total period fertility rates. Any increase in period fertility will also 
depend upon the extent of recuperation of delayed births, which is likely to vary from 
one country to another. 
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